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LYNDA L. BUTLER 
Defining Public Consumptive Rights 
in Virginia's Rivers, Streams, and Lakes: 
Is Legislative Reform Needed? 
D URING the seven-year period from 1977 through 
1983, Virginia experienced three severe droughts that 
caused millions of dollars in damages_ 1 Perhaps the 
most serious of the droughts occurred in 1983, when 
drought conditions persisted for months in eighty-two 
out of the state's ninety-five counties_ During that 
summer most areas of the state received less than 
half the normal rainfall. By the end of the 1983 har-
vest season, the drought had caused an estimated 
$200 million in damages to the state's crops.2 
Agricultural users were not the only ones detrimen-
tally affected by the droughts. Many Virginia locali-
ties faced weeks of dangerously low water supplies. 
Drought conditions in 1980, for instance, decreased 
the groundwater table by as much as four feet in some 
areas and caused water reservoir levels to fall signifi-
cantly.3 The 1980 drought was so severe in southeast-
ern Virginia that the Governor proclaimed a water 
resource emergency for the area. 4 Several localities 
imposed mandatory water use restrictions,5 while the 
limited water supplies of two localities prompted them 
to adopt water rationing plans.6 
Although the actual drought conditions have now 
abated, the droughts continue to have an impact in 
Virginia. One of their most important consequences is 
that they have focused attention on the degree to 
which Virginia law adequately provides for the con-
sumptive needs of the public. Because of rapid popu-
lation growth in several of Virginia's water-poor 
areas, interest in this issue should remain strong until 
the water supply problems of those areas are alle-
viated.7 This article will examine the nature of public 
consumptive rights in Virginia's rivers, streams, and 
lakes. It will begin by discussing the legal principles 
presently governing use of Virginia's watercourses. 
Then, after evaluating how well those principles 
accommodate the public interest, it will briefly dis-
cuss several proposed legislative reforms to determine 
whether they provide a more acceptable accommo-
dation. 
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An Introduction to the Riparian Doctrine 
Most of the legal rules governing consumptive use 
of Virginia's rivers, streams, and lakes are from the 
common law. Although the General Assembly has 
enacted some statutory modifications, the vast major-
ity of these amendments supplement the common law 
rather than replace it.8 Under Virginia 's common law 
each water resource is classified according to its place 
in the earth's ''hydrologic,'' or water circulation, cycle 
and separate legal rules are developed for the major 
classifications. Those principles governing use of 
natural watercourses, one of the main classifications, 
collectively are known as the riparian doctrine. The 
basic tenet of that doctrine is that a party owning 
land abutting a watercourse has the right to make 
reasonable uses of the watercourse for the benefit of 
his riparian land .9 Because these use rights arise as 
incidents to ownership of land bordering the water-
course, they generally are considered to be vested 
property rights lO which cannot be impaired arbitrar-
ily or taken without just compensation by the state. I I 
Under the riparian doctrine two key principles 
define and limit consumptive interests in Virginia's 
watercourses. First, a riparian proprietor can exercise 
his rights only for the benefit of riparian land. 
Second, the riparian's use must be reasonable. Devel-
oped in an era when most riparians were private par-
ties , these two principles reflect assumptions and pol-
icies that limit their ability to accommodate the 
public's consumptive needs. 
The Riparian Land Limitation: Restricting the Area 
to be Benefitted 
The riparian land limitation serves an important 
function under Virginia law: it restricts the area that 
can benefit from use of surface waters and thus offers 
some protection for present users. To qualify as ripar-
ian land, a tract naturally must have physical contact 
with a watercourse. Because this standard, though, 
fails to indicate how much land is riparian, the courts 
have developed several other tests for identifying 
riparian land. 
One additional standard applied by the Virginia 
courts is the watershed test. Under this standard land 
must be within the watershed, or natural drainage 
area, of a watercourse to qualify as riparian to that 
watercourse. 12 As explained by one court, this limita-
tion ensures that any water withdrawn, but not fully 
used, by one riparian will remain in the watershed 
and thus be able to return to the watercourse for use 
by other riparians in that watershed. 13 
A further refinement to the definition of riparian 
land provides that land not abutting a watercourse 
must have been acquired in the same transaction as 
the portion touching the watercourse to qualify as 
riparian land. 14 The courts apparently developed this 
limitation to prevent abuse by riparian owners. 
Because this qualification restricts riparian status to 
land acquired in a single transaction, a riparian pro-
prietor cannot enlarge his tract of riparian land by 
purchasing land contiguous to his original tract of 
riparian land but not contiguous to the watercourse. IS 
Although the restriction thus achieves a more equita-
ble distribution of consumptive rights, it limits the 
area within the watershed that can be benefitted. For 
a riparian locality steadily growing in size, this lim-
itation can have serious consequences. 
A final qualification developed by the Virginia 
courts restricts riparian status to tracts that are uni-
tary in a physical sense, as defined by reasonable 
community standards and location in the watershed. 16 
This limitation helps to define the priority status of 
riparians and to ensure that an unreasonable burden 
is not imposed on them. For instance, under the uni-
tary tract standard, a party owning a tract consisting 
of two main sections connected by a thin strip could 
not claim that the lower section should receive the 
same priority of use as the upper section. I ? Also, if the 
unitary tract requirement were not imposed, a ripar-
ian landowner would have to review periodically the 
deeds of his neighbors to protect his riparian rights 
from fraudulent conveyances that had included his 
land within the boundaries of neighboring land. 
The Reasonable Use Limitation: Imposing Quantita-
ti ve Limits to Resolve Conflicts 
The reasonable use limitation also serves an 
important function under Virginia's riparian doc-
trine: it defines the quantitative use rights of each 
riparian and thus provides a standard for resolving 
conflicts among users. Whether a use is reasonable 
depends on the facts and circumstances of a particu-
lar situation. Factors affecting the reasonableness of 
a use include the normal conditions of a watercourse 
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(such as size and flow), the purpose of the use, the 
compatibility of the use with other uses, and the sta-
tus of the user as an upper or lower riparian. 18 
Although the importance of a use is not determina-
tive, domestic uses such as drinking, bathing, cook-
ing, and watering livestock tend to receive a higher 
priority. 19 
The judicial preference for domestic uses suggests 
that a riparian locality meeting the domestic needs of 
its inhabitants would have priority over most other 
users. In applying thp reasonable use standard, 
though, the Virginia courts have taken a narrow 
perspective, defining the standard primarily in the 
context of an individual private riparian.20 This 
approach may have been responsive to the demands 
of riparians in the 1800's when many of them were 
private persons who supplied their own consumptive 
needs. Today, however, it fails to reflect modern water 
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use patterns, primarily because local governments 
have assumed responsibility for many of the domestic 
uses previously conducted by private riparians. De· 
spite this change in roles, the courts in Virginia and 
many other riparian jurisdictions continue to define 
the reasonable use restriction from their traditionally 
narrow perspective and appear reluctant to broaden 
the scope oftheir inquiry. 
Public Consumptive Rights under 
the Riparian Doctrine 
The Virginia courts use the same riparian princi-
ples to define public consumptive rights as they do to 
determine the nature and extent of private rights. As 
explained above, many of these principles assume 
that the user is a private party who is supplying most 
of his needs. Although this assumption may have 
been sensible when the riparian doctrine first devel-
oped, it seriously limits the water supply options of 
localities attempting to satisfy their inhabitants' 
needs. 
To operate a public water supply system effectively, 
local governments often need to divert water from a 
river or lake and store it for future use. Under Virgin-
ia's traditional riparian principles, a riparian gener-
ally cannot divert water from a watercourse for use 
beyond his riparian land.2 1 No exception is made 
where the riparian is a local government. A city or 
town does not acquire greater rights just because of 
its status as a governmental entity.22 Nor does it 
acquire consumptive rights because of the location of 
water resources within its boundaries . Although 
jurisdiction over water resources may provide suffi-
cient justification for regulating those resources, it 
does not confer riparian rights upon a locality. 23 
Thus, to be entitled to consumptive rights, a locality 
generally must be a riparian proprietor. 
Two principal explanations have been proffered by 
the Virginia Supreme Court as justifications for its 
no-diversion rule. The first is alluded to by the Court 
in a 1942 decision where it describes a diversion to 
nonriparian land as "an extraordinary and not a 
reasonable use"24 and thus suggests that it views all 
diversions to nonriparian land as per se unreasona-
ble. This approach is not followed in most other ripar-
ian jurisdictions, which appear unwilling to declare a 
diversion to be unreasonable without looking at the 
surrounding facts and circumstances.25 
The second , suggested by a 1921 Virginia Supreme 
Court decision, is that use of diverted water beyond a 
riparian's tract of land violates the riparian land re-
striction.26 This rationale poses a more serious obsta-
cle to localities attempting to create public water sup-
plies. Most diversions for public use would require 
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transfers to nonriparian land, often to areas in 
another part of the watershed and sometimes to areas 
outside the watershed. Yet, to be theoretically consist-
ent, the courts must prohibit diversions that directly 
conflict with the key definitions of riparian land. As 
long as the riparian land requirement remains an 
essential part of the riparian doctrine, substantial 
violations of the requirement must be unlawful. Any 
other approach would seriously undermine the poli-
cies being furthered by the riparian land restriction. 
Even under Virginia's traditional riparian princi-
ples, several exceptions to the no-diversion rule exist. 
Two exceptions based on related theories, the actual 
injury requirement and the surplus water doctrine, 
could enable localities to divert significant quantities 
of water. The first exception, using the actual injury 
requirement, arises because Virginia law requires a 
riparian to establish injury before it can obtain relief 
for an unlawful use.27 Although there is some confu-
sion among the Virginia courts about the meaning of 
injury,28 economic and equitable policy consider-
ations support this exception. As long as the diver-
sion for public use involves a reasonable share of 
water and does not interfere with other riparians' 
reasonable use rights, they should not have reason to 
complain about the unfair effects of the diversion. Fur-
thermore, allowing such diversions would increase 
the number of people benefitting from the water-
course at minimal cost to other riparians and would 
reduce the percentage of water in the watercourse not 
being used. 
The second exception , based on the surplus water 
doctrine, focuses on whether a diversion involves 
excess or surplus water. If a locality is diverting sur-
plus water-that is, water in excess of the natural 
flow of the watercourse-then the locality could argue 
that its conduct is not interfering with the rights of 
other riparians. A riparian generally is entitled to 
receive only the natural flow of a stream after reason-
able use by upper riparians.29 Once again, although 
Virginia has given conflicting signals about the 
validity of the surplus water doctrine,ao an exception 
based on it can be justified for the same policy rea-
sons as the first exception. 
Even if the surplus water or actual injury excep-
tions are accepted in Virginia, they do not provide 
permanent solutions to a locality's water supply prob-
lems. By definition, diversions based on these excep-
tions can continue without legal repercussion only as 
long as surplus water exists or injury does not occur. 
Furthermore, a locality conducting diversions under 
either exception probably could not seek judicial pro-
tection of its uses against unlawful conduct by others. 
Both theories permit the diversions because other 
riparians cannot sue, and not because the diverter 
has acquired a legally protected riparian right. 
If a locality desires a more permanent, but gener-
ally more costly, solution to its water supply prob-
lems, it can pursue several other exceptions to the 
no-diversion rule. For instance, as the Virginia Su-
preme Court recognized, a locality could acquire the 
necessary rights and interests entitling it to divert by 
pre cription, purchase, or condemnation.3l Acquisi-
tion by prescription, though, requires long, continu-
ous, wrongful use, while acquisition by purchase or 
condemnation is feasible only if a locality has suffi-
cient financial resources and purchasing powers to 
acquire the necessary interests.32 
If a watercourse is navigable, a locality also may 
attempt to justify a diversion for public use by relying 
on another important common law doctrine known as 
the public trust doctrine. Developed to a significant 
extent by the United States Supreme Court, this doc-
trine is based on the principle that a state holds cer-
tain resources, principally navigable waters and the 
bed underneath them, in trust for its citizens.3s 
Although the doctrine has enabled governments in 
other jurisdictions to make consumptive uses of 
watercourses not otherwise permitted by the riparian 
doctrine,34 it probably will not help local governments 
in Virginia. Given the state Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to recognize the doctrine as authorizing even 
more traditional public uses,35 it is unlikely that the 
Court will extend the doctrine to consumptive uses of 
navigable watercourses. 
Proposed Legislative Reforms 
In recent years the General Assembly has consi-
dered, but not enacted, several different legislative 
proposals to reform Virginia's water law. Perhaps the 
most significant of these proposals is the Virginia 
Water Law Bill, which calls for comprehensive revi-
sion of the riparian doctrine. Introduced as a bill in 
1981, the comprehensive proposal seeks to establish a 
permit system to regulate consumptive use of Virgin-
ia's surface and ground waters.3S Under the bill's pro-
posed permit system, any person making a "with-
drawal, diversion, impoundment, or consumptive use" 
of regulated waters must obtain a permit to do so, 
unless the use does not exceed 5,000 gallons per day.3? 
Nonregulated waters include "coastal waters,"38 or 
"waters of the Atlantic Ocean and the Chesapeake 
Bay within the jurisdiction of the state."39 Unless 
otherwise exempted, existing users must obtain a 
permit from the agency administering the system to 
continue their use.40 However, those existing users 
that apply should receive a permit automatically as 
long as their uses qualify as reasonable-beneficial 
uses. 4l Where an existing user is denied a permit, the 
agency must award reasonable compensation.42 
In evaluating permit requests, the agency adminis-
tering the system would have to grant a permit to an 
applicant, generally for ten years, unless it found that 
the proposed use was not a reasonable-beneficial use, 
interfered with existing legal uses, or was inconsist-
ent with state water planning or policy objectives:13 
As a condition of the permit, however, the agency 
may require the permittee to preserve certain min-
imum flOWS. 44 Also, like the permit systems adopted 
in other jurisdictions, the Virginia Water Law Bill 
would allow the regulatory agency to authorize diver-
sion of surface or ground waters by the holder of a use 
permit, provided that the agency determined that the 
diversion was "consistent with the public interest."45 
Several less ambitious reform measures also were 
introduced in the General Assembly in 1981 and 1982. 
Based on the premise that Virginia's riparian doc-
trine probably does not permit diversions, these mea-
sures attempt to eliminate or clarify those aspects of 
the riparian doctrine that restrict or impede diversion 
to nonriparian land. One bill, for example, seeks to 
minimize the possibility that a riparian would try to 
enjoin a diversion even though the use was "harm-
less." It provides that any "beneficial use of state 
waters is lawful as against any person unless such 
use causes harm to such person."46 "Harm" is defined 
as existing where there is interference with valid 
existing uses or a reduction in market value of ripar-
ian land.4? The bill also clarifies that a use is not 
unlawful just because it benefits nonriparian land or 
is conducted by a local government, but rather is to be 
evaluated on the basis of its reasonableness.48 Crite-
ria to be considered in making this evaluation include 
"the social utility of the proposed nonriparian use," 
the existence of "practicable alternative sources" of 
water, the degree to which the proposed use impacts 
on other water uses such as maintenance of in-stream 
flows for preservation of fish and wildlife, and the 
social utility of other uses that would be adversely 
affected by the proposed use.49 
Another partial reform bill deals with the diversion 
issue more directly, affirmatively authorizing the 
issuance of permits for diversions from one watershed 
to another found to be "in the public interest."50 Fac-
tors to be considered in making this finding include 
the effect of the transfer on such existing and future 
uses as recreational, private, public, industrial, and 
water quality uses, the "beneficial impact" ofthe pro-
posed transfer on the state and its cities and counties, 
the applicant's ability to "implement effectively its 
responsibilities under the requested permit," and the 
extent to which the proposed transfer affects the 
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rights of other states to use the waters of the affected 
s tream.5 1 More comprehensive than the "harmless 
use" proposal, this bill also requires a permittee to 
meet certain requirements after a permit is issued, 
including the payment of user fees and the obser-
vance of specified minimum flows or levels.52 Signifi-
cantly, forty percent of the compensation paid by the 
permittee is to be disbursed to the jurisdiction where 
the intake structure and appurtenant conduits are 
located, while the remaining sixty percent is to be 
divided among the regulatory agency and the locali-
ties adjoining the situs jurisdiction.53 
Both the comprehensive and partial reform mea-
sures have caused considerable controversy. The 
comprehensive proposal, for instance, has been cri-
ticized because it would alter, and perhaps even take 
away, the use rights of present riparians.54 Also, 
besides requiring substantial revenues to implement 
the new permit system, the comprehensive bill would 
place all regulatory power at the state level. Although 
the bill authorizes the state regulatory agency to 
appoint local advisory boards, this power is discre-
tionary.f>5 In a state with a long tradition oflocal rule, 
such a centralized approach understandably raises 
misgivings among local governments. 
If the goal of reform is to facilitate creation and 
expansion of public water supplies by allowing diver-
sions and other public consumptive uses, then the 
partia l reform proposals seem to achieve this goal just 
a s well as the comprehensive bill at far less cost. The 
partial reform measures, though, have one serious 
disadvantage. Because the primary goal of these pro-
posals is to facilitate diversions within the general 
framework of the riparian doctrine, they generally do 
not impose sufficient limitations on the diversions to 
protect the interests of water-rich jurisdictions. The 
harmless use proposal, in particular, attempts to 
allow diversions with as little disruption to the com-
mon law as possible. By failing to provide specific 
protections for water-rich localities, it fails to recog-
nize the important equitable concerns of water-rich 
jurisdictions.56 These jurisdictions, many of which 
are low-density rural areas, understandably fear that 
water-poor areas will rob them of important develop-
ment opportunities by attempting to divert some of 
their abundant water resources. The anger and sense 
of injustice felt by the water-rich jurisdictions is 
intensified by a belief held by many ofthem that they 
own the waters within their boundaries, or at least 
have the right to use the resources for the benefit of 
their inhabitants. Although this belief is not legally 
justified,57 it does seem to reflect a legitimate concern: 
a fair dis tribution of resources would seem to require 
giving a water-rich jurisdiction some priority over 
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other jurisdictions in using resources within its 
boundaries. 
The common law approach certainly provides for 
this concern better than the proposed reforms. As 
previously explained, under the common law a water-
poor jurisdiction generally cannot divert water from a 
water-rich area. The common law approach, however, 
fails to recognize the competing concerns and inter-
ests at stake. By prohibiting diversion of water-
courses for public use, Virginia's riparian doctrine 
seriously limits the options of water-poor localities. 
Because this situation exists in a state generally rich 
in water resources, it leads to frustration and resent-
ment among localities searching for water. Jurisdic-
tions poor in water resources are forced to bargain 
with parties willing to sell surplus water, often on 
unfavorable terms, or resort to their own diversion 
plans. Because these self-help schemes typically in-
volve the diversion and transfer of water from one 
watershed to another, challenges from private ripar-
ians and water-rich areas affected by the plans are 
likely to result. 58 
If the self-help scheme involves acquisition of the 
right to divert by purchase and condemnation, then it 
may survive a challenge. The courts generally permit 
agreements that purchase, restrict, or alter riparian 
rights59 and, where voluntary transactions are not 
feasible, localities with sufficient eminent domain 
powers can condemn the property interests affected 
by the plan.60 Not all water-poor localities, though, 
could afford to pursue this option . 
Where, however, the self-help scheme relies on pos-
sible exceptions to Virginia's no-diversion rule instead 
of acquisition of necessary interests by purchase or 
condemnation, then it could survive a challenge only 
if the Virginia courts were willing to recognize the 
need to modernize the riparian doctrine, interpret the 
exceptions broadly, and assume an active role in 
defining public consumptive interests. Even then 
unrestrained diversions probably would not be allowed 
under the riparian doctrine because of conflicts with 
key principles, unless the courts chose to rely on the 
public trust doctrine to justify the diversion plan. 
Given the propensity of the Virginia judiciary to fol-
low precedent and apply traditionally accepted legal 
principles, it is highly unlikely that such a situation 
would occur. Legislative reform thus would seem to be 
the only viable alternative for protecting and provid-
ing for the public's consumptive interests in Virgin-
ia's watercourses. To be politically acceptable, though, 
a proposal would have to achieve a better balance 
between the competing interests and policy concerns 
than that reflected in the reforms proposed so far . 
F OOTNOTES 
This article summarizes, and relates to Virginia, portions of 
another more comprehensive article entitled "Allocating Con-
sumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Interests" (currently 
unpublished manuscript available at Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia)_ 
1. See generally State Water Study Comm'n, Report to the 
Governor and the Genera l Assembly of Virginia, S. Doc. No. 15, 
at 5-6 (19 1) (describing 1980 drought); State Water Study 
Comm'n, Interim Report to the Governor and the General 
Assembly of Virginia, . Doc. No. 21 , at 5 (1979) (describing 
1977 drought); Va. Water Resources Research Center, 14 Water 
News, No. 10, at 1-2 (Oct. 1983) (describing 1983 drought) (here-
inafter cited a Water N ews ]; id., No.9, at 1-2 (Sept. 1983) (de-
scribing 1983 drought). 
2. 14 Water N ews, supra note 1, No. 10, at 1 (Oct. 1983). More 
. specifically, the 1983 drought caused an estimated $13 million 
10 s in sales to the state's potato and commercial vegetable 
farmers, $30 million in corn sales, $25 million in soybean sales, 
and $20 million in tobacco sales. Id. , No. 9, at 1 (Sept. 1983). 
During the 1980 and 1977 droughts, Virginia sustained crop 
los es totaHng $232 million and $292 million, re pectively. Id., 
No. 10, at 1 (Oct. 1983). 
3. See M. Hrezo, Norfolk v. Suffolk: Proposed Agreement 
Leaves Important Issues Unsettled 1 01a. Water Resources 
Research Center, Special Report No. 14, Nov. 1981}. See gener-
ally U.S. Geological Survey, Dept. of the Interior, Water-Data 
Report VA-8I-I, Water Resources Data: Virginia Water Year 
1981 (1982). 
4. Gov. of Va., Emergency Executive Order No. 45 (SO) (Oct. 
22, 19 0). 
5. E.g., Chesapeake, Va., Ordinance No. 80-0-0188 (Aug. 
19,19 0); Portsmouth, Va., Ordinance No. 1980-67 (Aug. 12, 
19 0). 
6. orfolk, Va., Ordinance 0. 30, 737 (Ju\. 25, 1980); Virgin-
ia Beach, Va., An Ordinance to amend Section 37-11(b) of the 
Code of the ity of Virginia Beach, Virginia (Oct. 13, 1980). 
7. The City of Virginia Beach , for instance, has experienced 
a 52% increase in population within the last ten years and now 
has about 6% of the state's population , yet does not have a 
substantial source of fresh surface water within its boundaries. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dept. of Commerce, 1980 Census of 
Population, Characteristics of the Population- Number of In-
habitants, U.S. Summary 1-43, 1-177. 
8. But see Ground Water Act, Va. Code §§ 62.1-44.83 to 
-44.107 (Rep\. Vo\. 1982). 
9. See Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 467, 
130 S.E. 40 ,410 (1925). ee generally 2 H. Farnham, The Law 
of Waters and Water Rights § 465 (1904). Although the doctrine 
of li ttoral rights, and not the riparian doctrine, technically gov-
erns consumptive uses of lakes, the principles of the littoral 
rights doctrine are virtually identical to those of the riparian 
doctrine. ee 6A American Law of Property §28.55 (A. Casner 
ed.1954). 
10. ee Hite v. Luray, 175 Va. 218, 226, 8 S.E.2d 369, 372 
(1940). 
11. ee Grinels v. Daniel, 110 Va. 874 , 877, 67 .E. 534, 536 
(1910). The rights of a riparian are not absolute, though, for 
other riparian landowners along the same watercourse also 
have a correlative and equal right to make a reasonable use of 
the watercourse_ Hit v. Luray, 175 Va. 218, 225, 8 .E.2d 369, 
371 , 372 (1940). 
12. See, e.g ., Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 551, 106 S.E. 
508,511 (1921). 
13. Id. at 552, 106 S.E. at 511 (quoting explanation of Ana-
heim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907) . 
14. Although the Virginia Supreme Court has not expressly 
adopted the single transaction standard, it has discussed the 
standard in favorable terms. See Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 
542, 553,555-57, 106 S.E. 50 ,512-13 (1921). 
15. See generally 2 H. Farnham, supra note 9, § 463(a). 
16. See Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542,106 .E. 50 (1921). 
17. In GordonslJille IJ . Zinn, id., a conflict developed between 
the tow~ of Gordonsville, which owned a one-acre lot abutting a 
nonnavIgable stream, and an individual riparian landowner, 
who had separately purchased two tracts ofland, located above 
and below the town's lot and connected by a strip of land. The 
land above the town's lot was approximately 25 feet in width 
and abutted the stream. The town sought an injunction to pre-
vent the individual landowner from withdrawing water from 
the streams at a point located on her upper property and pump-
ing it to her dwelling on the lower section. 
In considering the status of the defendant's land, the Court 
concluded that although the lower property was riparian to the 
stream, it could at best be regarded as lower riparian land in 
relation to the town's lot. As explained by the Court the lower 
section was not within the watershed of the upper s~ction and 
therefore could not be considered to be riparian to that part of 
the stream abutted by the upper property. Thus, the Court 
f~cus.ed on physical location within the watershed in defining 
npanan status. 
18. See Davis v. Harrisonburg, 116 Va. 864,869, 83 S.E. 401, 
403 (1914); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 13, 
73 S.E. 459, 462 (1912). 
19. ee Norfolk & Western Ry. Go. v. Graham Land & 
Improvement Co., 10 Va. L. Reg. 983, 984 (Cir. Ct. 1904). Water 
planning and policy provisions enacted in Virginia generally 
r~affirm the common law preference for domestic uses, espe-
CIally human consumptive uses. See, e.g., Va. Code § 62.1-
44.36(2) (Rep\. Vo\. 1982). 
20. See, e.g., Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 765, 40 
S.E.2d 298, 301 (1946) (pollution of stream by mine water held 
not to be a reasonable use); Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 
521, 19 S.E.2d 700, 703 (1942) (municipality diverting water for 
the domestic use of its inhabitants found not to be making a 
reasonable use). 
. 21. Carpenter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 14 S.E. 329 (1892). A ripar-
Ian, however, may be able to divert a watercourse if he returns 
the watercourse to its original channel before it leaves his land 
and other riparians are not injured_ Cook v. Seaboard Airline 
Ry., 107 Va. 32, 35, 57 S.E. 564,565 (1907). 
22. See Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921). 
23. Under recent statutory amendments, jurisdiction over 
water resources also gives a local political subdivision the 
power to approve or disapprove of various water projects pro-
posed by another subdivision when the projects are to be located 
within the boundaries of the locality having jurisdiction. See, 
e.g. , Va. Code §§ 15.1-37, -332.1, -456, -875, -1250.1 (Rep\. Vol. 
1981 & Supp. 1984). 
24. Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 521, 19 S.E.2d 700, 703 
(1942). Another rationale, also suggested by PurcellIJille, is that 
a diversion by a local government for the purpose of creating a 
pubHc water supply is an unreasonable use. ee id. 
25. See, e.g., Elliot v. Fitchburg, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191, 193, 
194 (1852); Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18, 19 (1892)' 
Lawrie v. ilsby, 76 Vt. 240, 56 A. 1106, 1109 (1904). ' 
26. Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 558-59,106 .E. 508 514 
(1921). ' 
27. See id. at 560, 106 S.E. at 514. 
28. Compare Panther Coal v. Looney, 185 Va. 75 , 765, 40 
S.E.2d 298, 301 (1946) (holding that only those interferences 
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that "impart to the water such impurities as substantially 
impair its value for the ordinary purposes of life, and render it 
measurably unfit for domestic purposes" are actionable) with 
Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 524, 19 S.E.2d 700, 704 (1942) 
(stating that "a diversion of a natural watercourse, though 
without actual damage to a lower riparian owner, is an infringe-
ment of a legal right a nd imports damage"). 
29_ Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 46~67, 
130 S.E. 408, 410 (1 925)_ But see Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 
542, 558, 106 S.E. 508, 514 (1921) (suggesti ng that Virgini a 
might follow the more restrictive English version, which gives 
riparians the right to the normal flow of a stream, undiminished 
by nonriparian uses regardless of how reasonable). 
30. Compare Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 562, 106 S.E. 
508,515 (1921) (apparently recognizing the doctrine) wilh 1971-
1972 Op. of the Att 'y Gen_ of Va. 80 (1972) (dismissing the doc-
trine as questionable). 
31. Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 563, 106 S.E. 508, 515 
(1921)_ 
32. Acquiring the right to divert would involve purchasing or 
condemning the flow and reasonable use rights of all riparian s 
below the point of diversion who would sustain injury because 
of the diversion . lfinjury is defined broadly to include potential 
harm, these acquisitions could be costly. It a lso would require 
purchasing or condemning easements from riparians and non-
ripari ans owning land between the diversion site and the desti-
nation area to permit transport of the diverted water. 
33. See Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 
(1892). 
34. See Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 56 
Minn. 485,58 N. W. 33 (1894), aff'd, 168 U.s. 349 (1897). 
35. See Commonwealth v. Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 164 
S.E. 689 (1932). 
36. The Virgin ia Water Law, H.B. 1420, 1981 Va. Gen. 
Assem. , Reg. Sess. 
37. ld. § 62.1 -23 l. 
38. Id. § 62.1-233. 
39. 1d. § 62.1-198.2. 
40. Id. § 62.1 -237. 
41. Under the bill existing users filing their initial permit 
requests would not have to follow normal permit procedures as 
long as their uses were reasonable-beneficial uses. See id. 
§§ 62.1-237, -238, -243. 
42. Id. § 62.1-240. 
43. Id. § 62.1-234. The regulatory agency, for example, may 
restrict uses that are inconsistent with environmental protec-
tion, public recreational needs, or procreation of fish and wi.ld-
life. ld. § 62. 1-2 17. 
If granted, a permit may last for ten years, unless the permit-
tee is a public uti.lity, in which case a fifty-year period is allowed. 
Id. §§ 62.1-244 to -245. Permits can be revoked for a number of 
reasons, including nonuse for two years or more. [d. § 62.1-247. 
Where competing applications are filed, the regulatory agency 
is directed to "allocate the water in a manner which best serves 
the public interest." Id. § 62.1-242. In the event that one of the 
competing a pplicants is a renewal, the agency is to prefer the 
renewal applicant. Id. § 62.1-243. 
44. ld. § 62.1-216. Under § 62.1-215 the regulatory agency is 
required to establish minimum flows for surface watercourses 
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and minimum levels for la kes a nd groundwater tables. In set-
ting the flows a nd levels, the agency may consider and provide 
for "the protection of nonconsumptive uses." ld. 
45. Id. § 62.1-235.A. 
46. H.B. 1338, 1981 Va. Gen. Assem., § 6.21 -11.2.A, Reg. Sess. 
47. Id. § 62.1- 11.2.B. 
48. Id. § 62.1-1l.3.A, -1l.4. 
49. ld. § 62.1-11.3.A. 
50. Interbasin Transfer Act, H.B. 503,1 982 Va. Gen. Assem., 
§ 62.1 -200.A, Reg. Sess. The bill exempts some interbasin 
transfers, including those less than 500,000 gallons per day. [d. 
§ 62.1-199.B. 
51. Id. § 62.1-200.B. 
52. ld. § 62.1 -202. 
53. Id. § 62.1-201.A. 
54. It, for example, could limit the duration of a riparia n's 
use. See supra note 43. 
55. The Virginia Water Law, H.B. 1420, 198 1 Va. Gen. 
Assem., § 62.1-211.11, Reg. Sess. The feasibility a nd effective-
ness of comprehensive reforms also can be questioned. See 
Butler, "Commentary on the Proceedings of the Water Rights 
Symposium," 24 Wm. & Mary L. Reu. 767, 785-93 (1983). 
56. The bill , however, does require all interbasin transfer 
requests in excess of an average daily rate of 100,000 gallons to 
be approved by the State Water Control Board . H.B. 1338, 1981 
Va. Gen. Assem., § 62.1-1l.3.B, Reg. Sess. 
H.B. 503, the bill directly a uthorizing interbasin tra nsfers, 
provides greater protection to water-rich localities than the 
h armless use proposal. Besides establishing a permit procedure 
for interbasin transfer requests not otherwise exempted, H.B. 
503 also requires the diverting jurisdiction to pay a user fee to 
the situs jurisdiction. Interbasin Transfer Act, H.B. 503, 1982 
Va. Gen. Assem., §§ 62.1-199 to -202, -204, Reg. Sess. 
57. Although the question of ownership of flowing water has 
been debated for years, most property scholars now agree that 
no one owns flowing water while it is in its natural state. See 6A 
American Law of Property § 28.55 (A. Casner ed. 1954); 5 R. 
Powell , The Law of R eal Properly § 710 (1981); I A G. Thompson, 
Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property § 261 (1980). 
58. See, e.g. , North Carolina v. Hudson, No. 84-36-CIV 5 (E.D. 
N.C. Jan. 12, 1984); Virginia Beach v. Champion International 
Corp., No. 84-10-N (E.D. Va. J a n. 9, 1984); Virginia Beach v. 
Roanoke River Basin Ass'n, No. 84-11-N (E.D. Va. Jan. 9,1984). 
The prospect of a change in the common law rules governing 
consumptive use of watercourses also raises an important fair-
ness concern among private users. A significant departure from 
prior law would , at the very least, impair their expectancy inter -
ests a nd may even deprive them of valuable property rights 
without due process or just compensation. See generally Aus-
ness, "Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems and 
Proposals ," 66 Ky. L.J. 191 (1977-1978). 
59. See, e.g., Ficklen v. Fredericks burg Power Co., 133 Va. 
571 , 596, 599, 112 S.E. 775, 783. 784 (1922). See generally 2 H. 
Farnham, supra note 9, § 470, at 1587-88. 
60. Virginia case law permits the state government to con-
demn riparian rights separately from the respective riparian 
land or submerged bed . S ee, e.g., Clear Creek Water Co. v. 
Gladeville Improvement Co., 107 Va. 278. 58 S.E. 586 (1907). 
